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STATE AID TO RHODE
ISLAND'S PRIVATE
SCHOOLS: A CASE
STUDY OF DiCenso v.
Robinson
PATRICK T. CONLEY*
FERNANDO CUNHA**
In the January 1969 session of the Rhode Island General Assembly,
House Majority Leader John Skefflngton of Woonsocket, freshman Repre-
sentative Robert J. McKenna of Newport, and several other prominent
Catholic legislators sponsored "An Act Providing Salary Supplements to
Non-Public School Teachers." The introduction of this measure precipi-
tated a controversy in the land of Roger Williams over state aid to sectarian
education that was ultimately resolved by the United States Supreme
Court.
Necessary to a full understanding of the issues involved in the salary
supplement case is a brief description of the sociopolitical structure of
Rhode Island. According to the 1970 census, the state had a population of
nearly 950,000.' Of this number, approximately 600,000 were Roman Cath-
olics according to estimates of the Diocese of Providence, a see coterminous
with the state itself.' Because Catholics comprise sixty-two percent of
Rhode Island's inhabitants, a proportion far larger than that of any other
state in the union, the Catholic Church can and does exert considerable
influence, both direct and indirect, on Rhode Island's educational and
political affairs.
The educational impact of the Church is more susceptible to measure-
ment than is its political influence. In the area of elementary education,
the domain with which this Article is concerned, the Catholic role is sub-
stantial. In the peak academic year 1963-1964, parish-related grammar
schools enrolled 38,455 pupils, or 28.3 percent of the elementary school
population in Rhode Island. By 1969-1970, the year of the controversy
discussed herein, enrollment in these schools was down to 29,340, or twenty
* Professor of History and Constitutional Law, Providence College; M.A., Ph.D., University
of Notre Dame; J.D., Suffolk University Law School.
** B.S.E.E., Southeastern Massachusetts University; J.D., Suffolk University Law School;
Member, Rhode Island Bar.
I This firgure is derived from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS
OF POPUIATION, part 41, at 7 (1970).
' See DIOCESE OF PROVIDENCE, OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECORy (1972).
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percent of total school enrollment. Despite this decline, the Catholic effect
on the educational system was still very significant.'
A 1972 Rhode Island Department of Education report on public and
nonpublic elementary education in the state revealed that a complete
phaseout of Catholic elementary education would necessitate a $20,317,000
annual increase in the operating expenses of the public school system, a
jump of 13.4 percent. Some urban centers would be even more adversely
affected-the increased educational outlay in the heavily Catholic city of
Pawtucket, for example, would be a whopping 26.6 percent.'
Hence, for economic as well as the obvious religious and sociocultural
reasons, many individuals in Rhode Island are committed to the continued
existence of Catholic elementary schools. These institutions, however, are
in a grave financial plight which has resulted in numerous school closings.
The number of Catholic grammar schools reached a high of 112 in aca-
demic year 1966-1967. By the time of the salary supplement controversy
of 1969-1970, the number was down to ninety-eight, and by the 1971-1972
school year the number had decreased to eighty-three. This alarming and
precipitous decline has been caused by several factors: the enrollment and
contribution drop in many city parishes due to the suburban exodus; rising
educational costs due to inflation; the less competitive position of Catholic
schools as a result of continually increasing government aid to public edu-
cation; and the decline in vocations, the revolution in religious community
life, and the proliferation of clerical "dropouts" which have combined to
produce a critical shortage of religious teachers.
The clerical teacher shortage is the most significant cause of the eco-
nomic ills of Catholic elementary education. It was to remedy this condi-
tion that the Salary Supplement Act was passed. Statistics on the teacher
problem are alarming: In 1966-1967 there were 959 religious teachers,
mostly nuns, in parish elementary schools throughout the state; in 1969-
1970 the figure was 691; in 1971-1972 there was an incredible decline to 489.
During this same 6-year period, the number of lay teachers rose from 205
1 On the role of Catholic education in Rhode Island, the following sources from the archives
of the Diocese of Providence have been examined: DIOCESAN EDUCATIONAL COMM'N, THE
CHURCH'S MISSION IN EDUCATION: AN INTERIM AND PARTIAL REPORT (1969); HANDBOOK OF
SCHOOL REGULATIONS (1965 ed., as amended); Diocesan School Board Records, Folder 46-1;
Minutes of the Board of Education of the Diocese of Providence (1970-1971); Catholic Schools
in Rhode Island, Statement to the Rhode Island Board of Regents by the Rev. Edward
Mullen, Diocesan Superintendent of Schools (Feb. 5, 1970); Catholic Schools in Rhode
Island, Statement to the United States Senate, Subcomm. on Education by the Rev. Edward
Mullen (Jan. 18, 1972). Also of use were J. GARDINER, PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY
EDUCATION IN THE FOUR LARGEST DITRICTS OF RHODE ISLAND (1972), a report submitted to the
Rhode Island Department of Education, and H. BRICKELL, NONPUBLIC EDUCATION IN RHODE
ISLAND: ALTERNATrES FOR THE FUtRE (1969), a study prepared for the Rhode Island Special
Commission to Study the Entire Field of Education.
' J. GARDINER, PUBLIC AND NoNPUBLIC ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE FoUR LARGEST DisTuCs
OF RHODE ISLAND 14-17, 19, 24 (1972).
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to 328. The substitution of a lay for a clerical teacher means a threefold
increase in salary costs for a parish school.
It was apparent to the sponsors of the Salary Supplement Act that the
parish elementary schools were caught in a cruel dilemma. When the nuns
left the schools, lay teachers had to be hired at salaries competitive with
constantly rising public school stipends. To meet this cost, tuition had to
be raised. The increase prompted some parents to avoid the additional levy
by placing their children in free public schools. This move was facilitated
by the fact that a Catholic school staffed by lay teachers does not appear
to offer much of an alternative to public education. Thus, enrollments
declined and schools were forced to close.
To stem this trend, public funding by the state government seemed
necessary. Fortunately for the friends of parochial education, the General
Assembly was even more Catholic in composition than its constituency.
Both houses of the legislature were overwhelmingly Democratic, and the
strength of the Democratic Party in Rhode Island derives from a fortuitous
political coalition of ethnic Catholics forged during the late 1920's and the
New Deal era-Irish, Italians, French, and Portuguese.5 The General As-
sembly, it seemed, would be very receptive to a program of state aid to
private education. This body appeared especially amenable to a plan that
would save the private institution experiencing the gravest fiscal diffi-
culty-the Catholic elementary school. This was the religious, educational,
and political setting in Rhode Island at the start of this legal drama. The
curtain opened and the plot began to unfold when the January 1969 session
of the General Assembly commenced!
At the outset of this legislative conclave, an important but unresolved
question concerned the form which aid to private education would take.
There were two proposals which received discussion. The first was a
straight tuition grant to parents of private school children. This course of
action was supported by the Rhode Island Chapter of Citizens for Educa-
tional Freedom (CEF). The local affiliate of CEF was, in fact, predomi-
nantly Catholic. The membership of this powerful educational group con-
tained several prominent state legislators, including House Speaker Joseph
Bevilacqua, Deputy House Leader Aldo Freda, and Robert J. McKenna,
an irrepressible freshman representative from Newport. McKenna was an
associate professor of politics at Salve Regina College, a specialist in
church-state relations, and a prime mover in CEF.
The second legislative remedy for the fiscal ills of the nonpublic
schools was a proposal to pay a salary supplement to private school teach-
ers of secular subjects. Advocates of this measure felt such a plan would
' For a review of the religious and political affiliations of the Rhode Island legislators, see
the legislative biography section of the RHODE ISLAND MANUAL.
The bulk of information on the internal workings of the January 1969 session of the legisla-
ture was furnished to the authors by Representative Robert McKenna in an interview on April
16, 1973.
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ease the cost burden on private schools and make them better able to
compete for qualified teachers. This proposal was designed to raise the
salaries paid by private schools to public school levels. It should be noted
that in 1971-1972 the average teacher's salary in the public schools was
$9,322, while the average salary for lay teachers in Catholic schools was
$6,000, or only 64.4 percent of the public school figure. The salary supple-
ment proposal was favored by the Reverend Edward Mullen, superintend-
ent of Catholic schools for the Diocese of Providence. Father Mullen was
a lawyer, and he used his legal talents to prepare a draft of the salary
supplement bill. Eventually, he prevailed upon CEF to support his recom-
mendation.
Shortly after the opening of the January 1969 session of the general
assembly, the original version of the Act was introduced by Representa-
tives Skeffington and McKenna. Among those who assisted in its drafting
were Professor McKenna, Father Mullen, and Dr. William P. Robinson,
Commissioner of Education of the State of Rhode Island.7
Interviews conducted by the authors yielded considerable information
on the fate of the measure in the state legislature, but this story is much
too detailed and inscrutable for treatment in an Article of this scope. Some
developments, however, are worthy of note. The original version of the
measure would have allocated $1,500,000 in state aid, covered grades one
through twelve, and provided a thirty percent supplement, an amount just
sufficient to equalize public and private school salaries. Certain develop-
ments made some amendments necessary. First, Governor Frank Licht,
who supported the bill, was beset with a revenue shortage and could spare
only $400,000 to implement the measure. Second, Dr. Henry Brickell, a
state educational consultant, issued a report on Rhode Island's nonpublic
schools while the supplement bill was pending. In his report he analyzed
four different types of nonpublic schools: (1) private non-Catholic institu-
tions, (2) Catholic private schools, (3) Catholic diocesanhigh schools, and
(4) Catholic parochial elementary schools. The first two cateogories were
fiscally sound, the third in a slight economic bind, but the fourth group
was experiencing a severe crisis, according to Dr. Brickell, and was in need
of fiscal assistance.
On the basis of the Governor's budgetary limitations and Dr. Brick-
ell's findings, the salary supplement bill was amended. Teachers at exclu-
sive, well-to-do private schools, both Catholic and non-Catholic, were
eliminated by the insertion of a clause providing that teachers were ineligi-
ble in a school where per capita expenditure per student for secular sub-
jects was greater than the public school average. Next, high schools were
eliminated, and, finally, the supplement was reduced to fifteen percent.
These alterations lowered the necessary first year appropriation to
$375,000.
I Interview with Dr. William P. Robinson (May 2, 1973).
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Constitutionally, these amendments were significant. Under the origi-
nal bill, according to advance estimates, $600,000 of the $1,500,000 alloca-
tion would have gone to teachers in non-Catholic private schools. Under
the amended version, all $375,000 was to go to teachers in Catholic parish
elementary schools.8 The amendments gave the bill a distinctly Catholic
hue and rendered it more vulnerable to constitutional criticism under the
"purpose and primary effect" doctrine of School District v. Schempp.9
Another interesting aspect of the salary scheme concerned the role of
the commissioner of education. Legally, he was the executive agent of the
state board of education, but in the administration of the Act the commis-
sioner was given an autonomous role while the influence of the board was
negligible. Commissioner Robinson, a devout Catholic layman who as-
sisted in the drafting of the bill, contended that this result was intended.
Most of the seven-member state Board of Education were non-Catholics
who had been appointed by a three-term non-Catholic Republican gover-
nor, John H. Chafee. Dr. Robinson, a vigorous supporter of salary supple-
ments, was well aware that a majority of the board opposed the bill; hence,
the board was circumvented. 0
In its final form, the Act empowered the commissioner to establish
regulations for the disbursement of funds in February and June of 1970.
Eligible for aid were those nonpublic school teachers who exclusively
taught a subject required by the state, possessed a Rhode Island teaching
certificate, and received a salary, including the supplement, which met the
minimum salary paid to public school teachers. The effect of this last
requirement was to prevent any cleric from receiving funds under the Act.
The measure's preamble declared that it was state policy "to provide
a quality education for all Rhode Island youth." It then observed that
approximately twenty-five per cent of the state's elementary school popu-
lation attended nonpublic institutions that were "finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain their traditional quality." The preamble concluded
that the state's policy of quality education for all "would be seriously
impaired if the quality of education provided in said schools were to deteri-
orate." This rationale was accepted by the state's predominantly Catholic-
Democratic general assembly. The measure was reported to the floor by
the House Health, Education, and Welfare Committee by a six to three
vote which divided along party and religious lines; six Catholic Democrats
versus three Protestant Republicans. The bill passed the whole house by
a comfortable fifty-six to eighteen majority; fifty-two Democrats and four
Republicans including minority leader Oliver Thompson, a Catholic and
This amendment has been characterized as "close to being a 'religious gerrymander.'"
DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 119 n.8 (D.R.I. 1970) (three-judge court), aff'd, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
" Interview with Dr. William P. Robinson (May 2, 1973).
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a cosponsor of the legislation versus eighteen Republicans, most of whom
were Protestant.
In the senate, the road was tougher. As the session drew to a close in
early May, HEW Committee Chairman John McBurney informed the
bill's manager, Representative McKenna, that he lacked the votes needed
to report it to the floor. A vigorous eleventh-hour appeal by McKenna
turned the tide and the measure was approved. The margin was eight to
seven with Chairman McBurney casting the deciding vote. Once the bill
came to public view before the entire senate, its fate was more secure. On
the final day of the session it was carried by a twenty-six to thirteen mar-
gin in a vote which reflected political and religious divisions. On May 16,
1969, an apprehensive Governor Licht signed the Act privately and without
fanfare; its effective date was July 1, 1969.
There were others concerned with the constitutionality of the Act.
Paul McMahon, legal counsel to the Diocese of Providence, expressed his
reservations to the diocesan chancellor Monsignor Daniel Reilly in a letter
dated May 5, 1969. On the other side of the fence, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) also entertained grave doubts concerning the
Act's validity, and decided to challenge it.'2 During the fall of 1969, the
ACLU sought plaintiffs with standing to contest the law, and this course
of action produced six volunteers-Joan Di Censo, Donald R. Hill, Ann
Clayton, Alice Chase, Helen King, and Marie Friedel. Some had children
in the public schools and all were taxpayers of the state. They provided
the ACLU with the "case and controversy" prerequisite to a legal action
in federal court. ACLU lawyers relied heavily on the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Flast v. Cohen'3 to maintain a class action and establish
standing to sue for the plaintiffs:
The plaintiff-taxpayer's allegation in such cases [involving the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment] would be that his tax money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
such abuses of legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial
redress and the taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his
status and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his
claim of standing to secure judicial review."
Once Joan DiCenso and the other plaintiffs had lent their status to
the cause, the legal battle began. On December 16, 1969, Milton Stanzler,
an able and experienced ACLU attorney, filed a twenty-four point com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
This taxpayers' complaint alleged in substance that Catholic schools were
" Letter from Paul McMahon to Monsignor Daniel Reilly (May 5, 1969). See Letter from Rev.
Edward Mullen to Paul McMahon (May 21, 1969).
" The authors' insights into the ACLU side of the case are derived mainly from an interview
with Milton Stanzler, Esq., on May 2, 1973.
' 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 106.
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the primary beneficiaries of Rhode Island's Salary Supplement Act, that
the goal of such schools is the propagation of the Catholic faith and that
the statute, therefore, had as its purpose and primary effect the advance-
ment of religion. 5 The complaint also alleged that the statute constituted
compulsory taxation in aid of religion in violation of the free exercise
clause.
The defendants were Commissioner Robinson, General Treasurer
Raymond H. Hawksley, and State Controller Charles W. Hill. They were
named because of their roles in the disbursement procedure, and were sued
in their public capacities. Section II of the complaint, entitled "factual
allegations," contained fourteen assertions. While several dealt with the
specific provisions of the Act, the most interesting charges were those
which attempted to establish a connection between the measure and the
Catholic Church. For example, the complaint made the following asser-
tions: (a) "During the 1969 session of the General Assembly numerous
spokesmen for at least one religious body and organizations associated with
at least one religious body strongly and publicly called for and supported
legislation giving state financial assistance to church-operated schools;"
(b) "The act will primarily benefit parochial elementary schools;" (c)
"Under the language of the act substantially all payments . . . will be
made to teachers in religiously oriented schools;" (d) "The act on its face
authorizes payments which support sectarian educational institutions;"
and (e) the education in parochial schools is "conducted in an atmosphere
conducive to the promotion of religious doctrine and one in which it is
impossible to separate the sectarian from the secular." The complaint also
alleged that as of October 10, 1969, all of the approximately 200 teachers
who had applied to the commissioner of education for a salary supplement
taught at religiously-oriented schools.
The third section of the complaint set forth the constitutional causes
of action based upon the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment.The final section contained a fourfold prayer for relief, asking:
(1) that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Act unconstitu-
tional; (2) that the defendants be enjoined permanently from approving
payment of any funds under the Act; (3) that a preliminary injunction be
granted pending a trial of the issues; (4) "that the plaintiffs be granted
such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper."
When Milton Stanzler filed the complaint with the clerk of the court
he also filed his appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs. The summons was
returned on December 17, 1969, indicating that it was duly served on the
defendants and filed with the court. Service had been made on Americo
Campanelli, a Rhode Island assistant attorney general, who accepted on
behalf of Charles W. Hill, Raymond H. Hawksley, and William P. Robin-
son. On December 19, 1969, William J. Sheehan also entered an appear-
ance as attorney for the plaintiffs.
" See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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Since the result which the plaintiffs sought was a permanent injunc-
tion against the disbursement of funds under a state statute on the grounds
of unconstitutionality, the convening of a three-judge court was appropri-
ate. The three-judge court legislation required that where an interlocutory
or permanent injunction was sought to restrain the enforcement or opera-
tion of a state statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality, the applica-
tion should be heard and determined by a federal district court of three
judges.'" Therefore, on December 23, 1969, Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals designated Circuit Judge Frank M.
Coffin and District Judge Hugh H. Bownes of the district of New Hamp-
shire to sit with District Judge Raymond J. Pettine of the district of Rhode
Island. Judge Pettine conducted all proceedings between December 16,
1969, the date on which the complaint was filed, and March 18, 1970, the
date on which the three-judge court heard the case.
On December 29, an appearance was filed by Benjamin A. Smith, on
behalf of the plaintiffs. W. Slater Allen, assistant attorney general, filed
his appearance for the defendants on January 5, 1970, along with the
answer to the complaint and a motion to dismiss. Judge Pettine denied this
motion by written order on January 20, 1970. On January 21, 1970, a
hearing was held on the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining
order. Allan Shine and W. Slater Allen argued for their respective sides at
this proceeding. Judge Pettine ruled that a temporary restraining order
would not be issued at that time. On January 22, -1970, a separate motion
for a temporary restraining order was filed. On February 9, 1970, this
motion was heard with Mr. Shine and Mr. Allen again presenting argu-
ments. Judge Pettine, by a written ruling on February 13, 1970, granted a
temporary restraining order which was to run until the hearing date of
March 18, 1970.
An important development occurred on February 11, when several
additional parties filed motions to intervene as defendants. Appearances
were made on behalf of the intervenors by Richard P. McMahon, William
F. McMahon, Jeremiah C. Collins, Charles H. Wilson, and Edward Ben-
nett Williams, who was principal counsel. The McMahons were Provi-
dence lawyers, while Williams, Collins, and Wilson were prominent Wash-
ington attorneys and partners in the same firm. These five lawyers repre-
sented a group consisting of private school teachers and parents who had
children in Catholic elementary schools. The lead intervenor was John R.
Earley. Judge Pettine filed an order giving this group leave to intervene
under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits
intervention in an action
11 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (current version at Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90
Stat. 1119-1120 (1976)). The three-judge court provisions were substantially amended in 1976
and currently limit the empanelment of such courts to actions "challenging the constitution-
ality of the apportionment of Congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide
legislative body."
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when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties."
These intervenors suggested that because of their status as parents and
teachers they could raise constitutional issues related to public aid to
private sectarian education that might not be properly asserted by the
original defendants.
On March 18, 1970, the case went to trial before Judges Coffin,
Bownes, and Pettine. On the trial day, an appearance for the plaintiffs was
entered by Leo Pfeffer of New York, a nationally-known civil libertarian
and authority on church-state relations. Pfeffer and Milton Stanzler were
the principal trial counsel for the plaintiffs, W. Slater Allen represented
the defendants, and Jeremiah C. Collins argued for the intervenors.
At the outset of the hearing, Slater Allen made a motion to dismiss
which was disputed by Pfeffer. The court chose to reserve judgment on the
motion. This tactic allowed the court to hear all the evidence in the case
before deciding on the motion. A total of six witnesses were called and
twenty-six exhibits were entered. The trial continued through March 19.
On that day, summations were made by Jeremiah Collins for the interven-
ors and by W. Slater Allen for the defendants. Summation for the plaintiffs
was conducted by Leo Pfeffer. The court then called for briefs to be sub-
mitted by April 6, 1970. On the final day of the trial, an appearance for
the plaintiffs was made by Franklin C. Salisbury as amicus curiae. Salis-
bury was representing "Protestants and Other Americans United for the
Separation of Church and State." The court granted Salisbury permission
to submit his brief.
On March 20, 1970, the court allowed the temporary restraining order
to lapse. This action was not contested by the plaintiffs, who waived their
prayer for a preliminary injunction. According to Milton Stanzler, this
action was a policy decision of the ACLU lawyers. They were mindful of
the climate of opinion in Rhode Island alluded to at the outset of this
Article, and they did not wish to penalize those teachers who had made
contracts in good faith reliance upon the salary supplement law. Once the
restraining order lapsed, Commissioner Robinson eagerly proceeded to
grant the initial installment to those nonpublic school teachers who had
qualified for payment."
The three-judge federal court delivered its anxiously awaited opinion
on June 15, 1970, just prior to the time scheduled for the second install-
ment of the salary supplement. The verdict was unanimous; all three
jurists found that the Act was unconstitutional, 9 with Judge Raymond
' FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
" Interview with Milton Stanzler (May 2, 1973).
" DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Pettine concurring in the result but dissenting in part from the majority
view.
At the outset, the question of standing was resolved in favor of the
plaintiffs, 20 with reliance placed upon Flast v. Cohen2' and Doremus v.
Board of Education. 2 The court next concerned itself with findings of fact
by examining "the statutory scheme, '2 3 "the nature of the crisis leading
to the statute, ' 2 and "the parochical school system. ' 25 The most signifi-
cant findings from a constitutional perspective were these: (1) the commis-
sioner of education required nonpublic schools to
submit data concerning enrollments and total expenditures. If this data indi-
cates a per pupil expenditure in excess of the statutory norm, an agent of the
Commissioner must examine the books of the school in question in order to
determine how much of its spending was attributable to secular education
and how much to religious;2 1
(2) Approximately 250 teachers had applied for aid, and "all of these
applicants are employed by Roman Catholic schools; '27
(3) [Tihe diocesan school system is an integral part of the religious mission
of the Catholic Church. It is not that religious doctrine overtly intrudes into
all instruction. Rather the combined conveniences of ready access to church
and pastor, homogeneous student body, and ability to schedule throughout
the day a blend of secular and religious activities makes the parochical school
a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation.2
On the basis of these findings, the court proceeded to formulate sev-
eral conclusions of law. Surprisingly, the court rejected the purpose and
primary effect standard of School District v. Schempp9 despite its conclu-
sion concerning the recipients of the supplement and notwithstanding the
fact that the plaintiffs placed heavy reliance on this doctrine. The judges
rejected the plaintiffs' attempt "to divine the 'true intent' of the legislature
by inspecting the activities of the lobbyists,"30 and asserted that the
Schempp test contained deficienies.3'
The court found the first and third findings of fact more persuasive.
Because of the nature of parochical schools, the court concluded that the
Act provided "substantial support for a religious enterprise. '3 2 In view of
316 F. Supp. at 114 n.1.
21 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
342 U.S. 429 (1952).
n 316 F. Supp. at 114.
24 Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
21 Id. at 115.
27 Id.
" Id. at 117.
- 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
316 F. Supp. at 119.
' Id. at 120.
' Id. at 122.
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the supervisory role exercised by the commissioner, the court held that the
"act results in excessive government entanglement with religion and thus
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."3 The judges
placed heavy emphasis on a test which the Supreme Court had devised
only the month before in Walz v. Tax Commission.3" The court in DiCenso
determined that the Walz test of a statute's effect was "whether the degree
of entanglement required by the statute is likely to promote the substan-
tive evils against which the First Amendment guards. 13 5 The Rhode Island
law, the court stated, authorized a subsidy which must be annually 're-
newed and one which "will inevitably excite bitter controversy. ' 3 In addi-
tion, it created an "ongoing administrative relationship between govern-
ment and the Catholic schools, '37 and "may significantly limit the internal
freedom""8 of those schools. Ironically, the Walz decision itself had sus-
tained New York City's tax exemption on property used for religious pur-
poses. In DiCenso, however, the Walz test was employed to invalidate "the
kind of reciprocal embroilments of government and religion which the First
Amendment was meant to avoid."39
The court gave short shrift to the plaintiffs' free exercise claim, be-
cause there was "offered no testimony concerning . . . personal religious
beliefs and practices, or lack thereof" and thus the plaintiffs had "failed
to introduce the kind of particularized evidence necessary 'to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against [them] in the
practice of [their] religion.' "40 Finally, the court considered the equal
protection claim of the teacher-intervenors and the free exercise claim of
the parent-intervenors. The claim of the former asserted that a Salary
Supplement Act restricted by judicial decree to aiding teachers in non-
public but secular schools would deny equal protection because of discrim-
ination against teachers of secular subjects on an impermissible ground,
i.e., religion. The court felt that such a distinction was "commanded by
the Establishment Clause." Therefore, "even though religion in general
may be a suspect classification, the mandate of the Establishment Clause
provides an overriding justification in this case.""
The parent-intervenors asserted that they
[felt] in conscience bound to send their children to parochial schools which
teach both secular subjects and religion. If, however, the quality of secular
education [fell] too low in parochial schools, the parent-intervenors
[contended that they might] well be forced to ignore the dictates of consci-
3 Id. (footnote omitted).
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
316 F. Supp. at 120.
, Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
'Id.
3' Id. at 122.
, Id. at 118, quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (brackets in DiCenso).
" 316 F. Supp. at 122.
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ence by sending their children to public schools. To avoid this result, inter-
venors argue[d] that the free exercise benefits which flow from aid to par-
ochial education should prevail over the establishment clause values pro-
tected by strict separation .. .."
The court, however, rejected "the notion that the Free Exercise Clause
demands affirmative state action to accommodate such personal evalua-
tions when society at large has accepted the premise that religious and
secular education can be successfully separated."43
Judge Pettine authored a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. He agreed with the court's decision to apply the Walz
test and noted the "excessive entanglements" inherent in the Act, but he
denied the majority's contention that the Act's effect was "substantially
to support a religious enterpise."l He made the formidable contention that
"[o]nly proof will establish that subsidization of an educational enter-
prise is subsidization of a 'religious enterprise,' " and observed that "there
is unanimous unrebutted testimony from several teachers of secular sub-
jects in Roman Catholic schools that religion does not enter into their
teaching process."4 5
On June 17, 1970, the judgment and order were formally entered: the
defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, the Salary Supplement Act was
held unconstitutional in that "it violates the First Amendment of the
Constitution insofar as it authorized aid to teachers employed by denomi-
national schools," and the defendants and their agents were permanently
enjoined from making any payments or disbursements under the Act to
teachers employed by denominational schools.
On the same day, W. Slater Allen and Richard P. McMahon filed an
application for a stay, alleging that the injunction would create problems
in the negotiation of teacher contracts in parochical schools for the 1970-
1971 school year and that an appeal to the Supreme Court would be forth-
coming. Judge Pettine denied the motion because he felt there would be
"a loss to plaintiff taxpayers" of "a substantial sum of money when we
realize the uncertainty of a date of final disposition" by the Supreme
Court. An order expressing that rationale was promptly entered on June
17.
The defeated defendants lost no time in bringing their cause to the
attention of the United States Supreme Court. Edward Bennett Williams
filed an appeal for the intervenors on June 19, and Attorney General Her-
bert F. DeSimone performed a similar task for the defendants on June 25.
DeSimone also appointed Charles F. Cottam, a special attorney general,
to argue the case before the High Court. Cottam had a longstanding inter-
est in church-state questions."8
4 Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
43 Id.
Id. (Pettine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'5 Id. at 124.
4' Interview with Herbert F. DiSimone (May 1, 1973).
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On June 26, the record on appeal together with a certified copy of the
docket entries were mailed to the clerk of the Supreme Court. The appeals
were taken pursuant to a statute which provides for a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court from a three-judge district court. 7 The appellants then
appeared before Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, to request a
stay. Justice Brennan denied the request, but was promptly overruled by
the full Court. 8 Thus, on July 1, a certified copy of the order granting a
stay pendente lite was received from the high tribunal and filed in the
Rhode Island district court.
Later in the month, jurisdictional statements were filed with the Su-
preme Court by the defendants and intervenor-defendants. In a curious
move, the ACLU lawyers for DiCenso filed an answer to the jurisdictional
statements which also urged the Court to decide the case. According to
Milton Stanzler, this action was motivated by the desire of the ACLU to
have the important issues raised by these cases finally adjudicated. This
concern was shared by the intervenors, and accounted for the failure of the
parties to erect procedural roadblocks which would have delayed court
action at either the district or Supreme Court level.' 9 After examining the
statements of the parties, the Supreme Court noted "probable jurisdic-
tion" on November 9, 1970.10
This action was the signal to the attorneys to prepare their final briefs
for argument before the Suprme Court. The day of presentation came on
March 3, 1971. Each side was allocated one-half hour on the Court's busy
schedule. Edward Bennett Williams argued the cause for Earley, while
Charles F. Cottam argued for Robinson. Leo Pfeffer and Milton Stanzler
shared the rostrum in arguing the appellees' cause. Briefs were filed by all
of the parties to the action. In addition, because of the significant constitu-
tional questions raised by this case, six amicus curiae briefs were filed.
Four urged affirmance (viz., the American Jewish Committee, Protestants
and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, the
Center for Law and Education at Harvard University, and the Connecticut
State Conference of Branches of the NAACP), while two urged reversal
(viz., the National Catholic Education Association and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice).5'
The Court studied the material presented to it, and nearly four
months later it rendered its decision, consolidating the appeal in DiCenso
with a similar Pennsylvania case, Lemon v. Kurtzman." A detailed sum-
mary of the Court's decision would be somewhat repetitious, for in essence
,7 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
" Robinson v. DiCenso, 399 U.S. 918 (1970).
" Interview with Milton Stanzler (May 2, 1973).
Earley v. DiCenso, 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
" The briefs of the parties are summarized and the amicus curiae briefs are noted in 29 L.
Ed. 2d 1088-90, 1095-97 (1971).
12 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (three-judge court), rev'd, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the Court adopted the argument of the three-judge district court. The
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, affirmed the lower court
ruling by accepting its finding that the Act "fostered 'excessive entangle-
ment' between government and religion" and "had the impermissible ef-
fect of giving 'significant aid to a religious enterprise.' "I' Justice Burger
noted the "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil-
lance"" required by the Act, and concluded that "[t]hese prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state
and church."' '55
The free exercise issue raised by the intervenors was ignored in the
opinion of the Court, as were the free exercise claims of the appellees. But
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Marshall, touched upon
these and other issues in an impassioned and far-reaching concurring opin-
ion. In essence, Justice Douglas would have sustained every contention in
the ACLU's original complaint. The concurring opinion concluded by af-
firming that "a history class, a literature class, or a science class in a
parochial school is not a separate institute; it is part of the organic whole
which the State subsidizes" 5 6-a whole that is permeated with religious
values. In Justice Douglas' view, therefore, "the taxpayers' forced contri-
bution to the parochial schools in the present cases violates the First
Amendment."57
Justice Brennan also filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Bren-
nan's historically-oriented discourse concluded that "in using sectarian
institutions to further goals in secular education, [the Salary Supplement
Act does] violence to the principle that 'government may not employ
religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be,
at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will
not suffice.' ",58
Justice White authored a lone dissent which urged a reversal of the
district court decision. He observed, as had Judge Pettine, that "[tihe
Court points to nothing in this record indicating that any participating
teacher had inserted religion into his secular teaching."'59 Justice White
further argued
Where a state program seeks to ensure the proper education of its young, in
private as well as public schools, free exercise considerations at least counsel
against refusing support for students attending parochial schools simply be-
cause in that setting they are also being instructed in the tenets of the faith
they are constitutionally free to practice. 0
53 403 U.S. at 609, quoting 316 F. Supp. at 112.
" 403 U.S. at 619.
55 Id.
, Id. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'7 Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., concurring), quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 265
(1963).
3, 403 U.S. at 667 (White, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 665.
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Finally, the dissent contended that the Act did not violate the first amend-
ment since indirect benefit to religion from government aid to sectarian
schools in the performance of separable secular functions does not convert
such aid into an impermissable establishment of religion." This position,
however, was unavailing. The Court immediately ordered the lower court
judgment affirmed and sent notice of this decision to the clerk of the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
Meanwhile, back in Rhode Island, payment of the June, 1971 salary
supplement was causing some dispute. Commissioner Robinson was deter-
mined that the money should be disbursed. Therefore, on June 15, when
the Supreme Court opinion was imminent, he ordered the supplement
vouchers processed. He hoped to have the checks in the mail prior to the
High Court's ruling so that in any event the teachers would be paid. 2
Charles Hill, the codefendant state controller, balked at this move and
refused to disburse the funds. When the Supreme Court's decision was
announced on June 28, the new attorney general, Richard Israel, decided
that the Court's opinion was sufficient reason to cancel the June supple-
ment. This action put to rest one phase of Rhode Island's aid to private
education controversy, but the proponents of such aid have only left the
field to return another day. 3
I ld. at 664.
62 Interview with Dr. William P. Robinson (May 2, 1973). Milton Stanzler informed the
authors that the Rhode Island ACLU lawyers made a "policy decision" not to bring a suit to
recover the three supplement payments which had been disbursed in February and June of
1970, and in February 1971. He felt that this was a "wise decision" in view of the climate of
opinion in Rhode Island and also in view of the fact that the Pennsylvania plaintiffs in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), were rebuffed by the Supreme Court in an attempt to
recover state funds which had been paid prior to the time when the act challenged by the
litigants in that case was declared unconstitutional. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
62 For discussion of the Court's holding in DiCenso and Kurtzman and some subsequent
developments, see Taylor, Nine Rulings: Three Wins, Three Losses, and Three Remands on
Government Aid to Church-Related Institutions, 17 CATH. LAW. 182 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Barriers to Public Assistance for Parochial Schools, 17 CATH. LAW. 189 (1971);
Note, "Save our Schools"-A Challenge Beyond the Courts, 18 CATH. LAW. 174 (1972).
